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ABSTRACT
Malaysia’s technocracy (administrative elite) and the government of the day (po-
litical elite) have had and continue to enjoy a harmonious and symbiotic relation-
ship. Such synergy had its origins and background in British colonial rule when
promising Malays were groomed for administrative positions. The dawn of
merdeka (national independence) allowed for the transition from administrative
positions to political leadership. The first three prime ministers, namely Tunku
Abdul Rahman, Abdul Razak and Hussein Onn were drawn from these ranks.
There was an organic development in the relationship between the ‘old’ techno-
crats and politicians expressed in shared strategic outlook and direction. As such,
national development was characterised not by intermittent periods of political
disruption but a sustained period of continuity in the pre-conditions for eco-
nomic growth which extended and heightened throughout the premiership of
Mahathir Mohamad. His successor, Abdullah Badawi, started to install corporate
figures as technocrats to professionalise the governance of the administrative
system. Under Najib Razak the role of these ‘new’ technocrats was further en-
trenched and enhanced.
Keywords: Technocracy; economic management; developmental politics;
Najibnomics
INTRODUCTION
The term, ‘technocracy’, is normally employed to refer
to the concept of ‘expert knowledge’ that is the provenance
of a ‘select’ few in the administrative system of a country
(e.g. Amir, 2008). Admittedly, and this is especially true of
developing countries particularly in the context of the Asia
Pacific generally, it is difficult to distinguish by way of in-
troduction between the administrative and political sys-
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tems (Ahmed, 2014). Both are not only inter-related by virtue of
similar and overlapping functions working towards a common
agenda, but that in some cases, the politician is also a technocrat
and vice-versa in that there had been a transition from the ad-
ministrative to the political roles – seamlessly. Intriguingly, such
a trend is also reflected in the PI(I)GS member states of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) recently where technocrats have been ap-
pointed to not only handle economic management but also over-
see the broader national crisis. That is, the recent debt crisis
(whether precipitated by the public or private sector) in South-
ern Europe which was then followed by the economic crisis of
rising unemployment, deflationary price levels, wage cuts, and
sustained recession had led in turn to a crisis of political leader-
ship. Politicians were not ‘trusted’ by the Brussels elite to be able
to turn the economy around by way of achieving a primary bud-
get surplus and austerity policies. Technocrats such as Mario
Monti and Lucas Papademos in the Mediterrannean member
states of Italy and Greece, respectively, had to be ‘appointed’ as
prime ministers at least as a ‘contingency’ arrangement to halt
the debt spiral as indicated by the spikes in the bond yields.
Now, the terms ‘technocracy’ and ‘technocrat’ are normally
used in general or abstraction to denote high-ranking or top level
bureaucrats with qualified expertise and accumulated experience
and knowledge with oversight of the administrative system and
management of policy-making and implementation. Technocrats
therefore are bureaucrats who have risen through the ranks within
the bureaucratic structures as part of the wider administrative
system. Thus, the technocracy refers to a small group of elites
that can be regarded as the crème de la crème (cream of the crop).
However, the terms might well be also employed to connote
certain context-specific or concrete situations whereby captains
of industry, corporate figures, politically exposed or connected
persons, military leaders (retired or serving), etc. are appointed
to assume technocratic roles. Thus, in terms of terminology, the
boundaries between the traditional and new technocrats are
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blurred. Both conceptual frameworks, however, would fit into
the ‘Elite Theory’ – in that technocratic elites are essential, criti-
cal and instrumental to perpetuating the position of the political
elites. That is to say, the technocratic (organisational) elite play
the role of maintaining and strengthening the position of the
political (power) elite in society (Farazmand, 1999).
Therefore, whilst not intending to oversimplify the phenom-
enon and overlook important nuances within the same context,
it could be argued that there is a lack of rivalry between the po-
litical and administrative (otherwise known as the technocratic)
elites in many Asian countries (Rashid, 2014). Such a relation-
ship is often underpinned by dominance or hegemony over the
electoral system (processes and outcome). Thus, democratic
legitimisation is derived from long-standing or established pres-
ence as the ruling party (as in the case of Malaysia, that of coali-
tion of parties with one dominant or leading component mem-
ber). [Exception would be in countries such as Thailand with its
‘intermittent’ coups and constitutional changes or upheavals just
falling short of the abolition of the monarchy and the concomi-
tance of a prime ministerial form of government].
Hence, the subordinated role of the technocracy in many Asia-
Pacific countries is not just relative but absolute. That is to say,
the subordination is total and complete for it involves the tech-
nocracy not only beholden in terms of role or function (i.e. that
of the enforcer or implementing agency of the executive will
embodied by the political or ruling elite), but also in terms of
hierarchy and organisationally. In other words, the independence
of the non-elected part of the ‘executive branch’ of government
is weak and nominal. One example is the security of tenure –
whereby top officials can be transferred – for the purpose of ‘cold
storage’ – at ease or sacked without question.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper proposes to look at one feature of the technocracy
in the Asia-Pacific – specifically in the Malaysian context – which
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is the relationship between the technocracy and the political elite.
This in turn entails concretising the boundary between the tech-
nocratic and political elite whilst maintaining the subordinated
status of the former. Furthermore, even though technocrats have
yet to assume the dominant role as seen recently in Southern
Europe, there has been the emergence of a ‘special group’ of
appointees that neither belongs to the bureaucratic class or order
(i.e. the administrative elite) nor are elected politicians or even
card-carrying members of the ruling party in Malaysia (i.e. the
political elite). It will be seen that these new technocrats could
actually supplant and not only complement and supplement the
position of the traditional bureaucrats.
FIGURE 1. THE PLACE OF THE ‘NEW TECHNOCRATS’ IN THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS OF MALAYSIA
Figure 1 illustrates the ‘complex’ relationship between the new
technocrats with the traditional administrative class on the one
hand; and with the political or ruling class on the other. As ap-
pointees from outside the structures and organisational ranks of
the bureaucracy, the new technocrats are deemed as belonging
to the political system (as politically connected or exposed per-
sons). Nonetheless, although they are political appointees, the
new technocrats lack the power base and political connection
with the grassroots. Thus, as non-political political appointees in
interface with the political system, the new technocrats can be
construed as a hybrid – that is a combination of technocratic
expertise and political linkages. Hence, the new technocrats stand
between the traditional or old technocrats and the executive.
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The hybrid nature of the new technocrats can be formulated
thus:
NT = P
p
 + t{Q1, Q2, …..}
where NT stands for ‘new technocracy’/ ‘technocrat’ and P
stands political connections with p as the intensity of exposure
combine with t signifying the assumed technocratic skills multi-
ply by the nature and extent of background qualifications.
Looking at the new technocrats in the wider context (e.g. the
political economy of an Asian country particularly in the case of
Malaysia of which this paper concerns), these could be categorised
as ‘crony technocrats or policymakers’ in that their relationship
with the executive is closer rather than at an ‘equidistant’ as is
supposedly the case with the old technocrats whose appointments
are based on conventional practices and customary processes of
rising through the ranks and promotions based on merit and
seniority. An interesting feature in Malaysia is that unlike in e.g.
the Philippines (Crouch, 1984), there is also a lack of rivalry or
struggle for access or influence between the crony technocrats
and the crony capitalists.
RESEARCH METHOD
In seeking to highlight and explicate the (inter)relationship
between the technocracy and the political elite in Malaysia, a
broad survey or overview will be conducted. The contents are
structured according to the historical developments and there-
fore necessarily follow a period-specific progression comparable
to a time-series analysis. The ‘base point’ is independence in 1957
(terminus a quo) with the 2015 as the ‘end point’ (terminus ad
quem).
FINDINGS
BACKGROUND – THE PRE-NEP PERIOD (1957-1970)
In 1957, the then Malaya inherited a well managed and highly
motivated bureaucracy from the British colonial administration.
The soaring morale stemmed from the nascent nationalistic spirit
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of many of the civil servants who were teeming with a sense of
hope, optimism and new found pride and freedom to shape the
destiny of the country. Furthermore, many of the bureaucrats,
particularly the more senior ones shared a common vision, out-
look and values with the new political elite. This could be attrib-
uted to the same educational background which has played an
important role in fostering and forging mutual affinity. Argu-
ably, the bureaucracy then was more respected or honoured by
the political elite, and the appropriate boundaries/limits between
the two forces in the system of government were observed and
maintained.
The stature of the policy-making bureaucrats or technocrats
was generally unimpeachable and they included Ismail Mohd
Ali who was Bank Negara’s second governor. It was he who has
been reputed to have set the tone for the institution’s core values
and instilled a culture of professionalism, integrity, competency
and accountability. People who knew and worked with him would
describe Ismail Mohd Ali as a stickler for punctuality and disci-
pline. Under his tenure, Bank Negara helped to introduce pro-
business measures which promoted the intermediation process
(of depositing and lending).
This complemented the legislative dimension of fiscal incen-
tives promulgated by Tan Siew Sin (as Finance Minister) designed
to facilitate import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) such as the
Pioneer Industries Ordinance (1958), Investment Guarantee Act
(1959) and the Investment Incentives Act (1968). Thus, economic
policies were geared towards protection of the local manufactur-
ing industry where exports were still largely dependent on the
primary resources or the commodities (rubber, tin, palm oil, tim-
ber).
Such was the extent of the nationalist attitude towards the
developmental agenda of the time. The bureaucracy did not ques-
tion but acquiesced in the industrial policy of the day which more
or less continued to reflect the pre-independence economic struc-
ture where foreign (mainly British) and ethnic Chinese domi-
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nated the economy and thus capital was mainly concentrated in
their hands. However, it would be a gross inaccuracy to infer that
the bureaucracy, particularly the technocrats, were detached or
self-insulated from socio-economic concerns.
On the contrary, there was indeed selective intervention by
the government focussing on the rural areas, particularly in rela-
tion to rice farmers. At the same time, assistance was also ex-
tended to smallholders and settlers through land redistribution
schemes under the Federal Land Development Authority
(FELDA). FELDA was helmed by technocrats such as Taib Andak,
a close friend and peer of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s successor,
Abdul Razak Hussein (1970-1976), worked hard for thirteen years
(1958-1971) to uplift the socio-economic status of the rural popu-
lace.
Here the shared vision and outlook of the technocrats with
the political elite or the Executive comes into prominent display.
Thus, it was no surprise that Taib Andak was selected to be the
Chairman of Maybank by Razak in 1969 even though he had no
prior banking experience. Razak’s relationship with Andak also
epitomises the high level of trust and confidence in the capabili-
ties of the technocrats and a close working relationship.
It could be reasonably surmised that the background of Razak
as the state secretary for Pahang – which in effect constitutes the
highest ranking civil servant in the state bureaucracy – meant
that there was a degree of mutual affinity and empathy between
the prime minister and the technocrats prior to the Mahathir
era. The common educational and professional background of
the political elite and the technocrats – which were a “logical”
extension or continuation of one from the other set within the
same (colonial) system – served to reinforce their affinity and
outlook. Under the British, the educational establishment par-
ticularly the colleges were preparatory grounds for promising or
aristocratic students to enter the civil service.
Dissatisfaction with the progress and extent of the develop-
mental agenda and the policy fundamentals was to emanate from
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within the ranks of the ruling party, United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO). One of the leading proponents of a “left-
wing” commitment was Aziz Ishak whose brother was a minister
of state across the Causeway in Singapore. Incidentally Rahim
Ishak was a member of the democratic socialist People’s Action
Party (PAP) government under Lee Kuan Yew whose vision of a
more egalitarian society was considered to be at odds with
UMNO’s conservatism.
1. THE NEP (1971-1990) AND THE MAHATHIR ADMINIS-
TRATION (1981-2003)
The ugly racial clashes of 13 May 1969 had left a scar in the
nation’s psyche. The event was to lay the political foundation for
the government to promulgate the New Economic Policy (NEP)
in 1971 to “eradicate poverty irrespective of race” and “eliminate
ethnic identification with economic function.” This included
setting a thirty per cent (30%) target in equity ownership by 1990,
and accelerating Malay and bumiputera participation in the
economy.
The NEP, true to its name, marked a new period in economic
decision-making, amongst other outcomes. Governmental inter-
vention had become more expanded in scope and its nature more
politicised than before, where the identity and role of the bu-
reaucracy became increasingly dependent on the patronage and
the political hegemony of the ruling coalition headed by UMNO.
This is because the NEP had at the same time enabled a more
systematic distribution of economic largesse and favours by the
government to consolidate its political legitimacy and promote
regime stability. Whilst there were approximately only 110 pub-
lic enterprises under the Razak administration in 1970, a decade
later the number has grown – as overseen by Tengku Razaleigh –
to more than 650. Since 1970 also, public sector spending was
estimated at RM3.3 billion. This figure had ballooned by ten-
fold to RM35 billion in 1982.
As such, the augmentation of rent-seeking opportunities un-
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der the NEP was to lead to the massive erosion of bureaucratic
integrity and accountability. However, it could be argued that
during the first decade of the NEP, the Executive – under Abdul
Razak and Hussein Onn (1976-1081), successively – still treated
the bureaucracy with institutional esteem, and relied heavily on
the advice and expertise of the technocrats as primary inputs for
the economic decision-making processes. Also the role of the
technocrats in the early years could be used to “justify” and there-
fore shape the decisions of the political elite but as NEP matured
in its implementation, business interests have become almost
synonymous with economic policies and this was to result in the
“marginalisation” of technocratic decision-making. In fact, Hus-
sein Onn had made it a top priority for his administration to
combat corruption and weed out enervating influences that
would hinder the effective working of the government machin-
ery.
Under Mahathir who inherited the mantle of prime minister
from Hussein Onn, the effective role and traditional prestige of
the Malaysian technocracy was to suffer ignominy and its “vis-
ibility” even more depressed. This is due to Mahathir’s personal
preference and his illiberal style of governance which detractors
say is authoritarian. Firstly, Mahathir’s penchant for unofficial
advisers who at the same time acted as proxies for the corporate
interests of the party (UMNO) epitomised the new nexus be-
tween politics and business. This meant that industrial policy
and the political economy of the country were largely dictated by
corporate interests. Hence, the economic outlook was character-
istically expressed not only by statist intervention but also active
and extensive participation in the market.
Secondly, Mahathir’s political authoritarianism – which served
an overriding purpose to provide a stable and cohesive environ-
ment for his market liberalism/liberalisation – inevitably side-
lined technocratic decision-making. His distrust and low estima-
tion of the bureaucracy were also contributing factor(s). This was
acutely and painfully illustrated when the Points of Agreement
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(POA), 1990 – which was supposed to come under the purview
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) – was signed by Daim
Zainuddin (the Finance Minister) on Mahathir’s behalf (and not
the Malaysian government since the conventional and official
formalities and procedures – such as seals and letter-heads – were
strikingly absent).
And ironically it also further insulated the technocracy from
political exposure and entrenched bureaucratic docility. In a re-
versal of scenario, now the technocracy and by extension the
bureaucracy can claim justification for its compliance to the Ex-
ecutive as personified by Mahathir on grounds that the develop-
mental agenda, particularly with respect to the uplifting of the
socio-economic status, and the preservation and promotion of
the constitutional rights/position of the Malays were yet an un-
finished business. Thus, it could be said that the increasing
marginalisation of the bureaucracy went in tandem with its in-
creasing politicisation as the institutional vehicle to ensure eth-
nic dominance in the form of “Malay supremacy.”
In summary, the relationship between the technocracy and
the Executive under Mahathir could be described as one of sub-
servience and even of covert rivalry. Whether that has been in-
fluenced by Mahathir’s so-called “plebeian” background in con-
trast to the elitist education received by many of the technocrats,
particularly of the pre-NEP era remains debatable and subject to
further research. However, it cannot be denied that the techno-
crats who had “earned” Mahathir’s confidence and trust remark-
ably hailed from similar background as his. One of them was the
former chairman of PETRONAS, Malaysian Airlines (MAS) and
Putrajaya Holdings, Azizan Zainul Abidin.  Prior to serving un-
der Mahathir, Azizan distinguished himself as the Secretary of
the National Operations Council (NOC) which was the inter-
regnum between the 13 May riots and restoration of parliamen-
tary democracy. A man of integrity and probity – the quintessen-
tial conscientious civil servant – Azizan was perhaps one of the
very few technocrats – which Mahathir had a high degree of “tol-
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erance” or gave allowance for dissenting views which in a sense
served to “check and balance” the excesses and accountability
deficit of the Executive.
2. THE END OF MAHATHIRISM AND THE ABDULLAH
ADMINISTRATION (2003-2009)
Malaysia’s notable economic growth rates since 1986 had
positioned it amongst the ‘tiger economies’ of Asia and of the
world and enhanced its international image as a business-friendly,
progressive and modern nation. The prospering nation was buoy-
ant with high expectations of continued development in the quest
to attain the status of a developed nation by 2020. Mahathir’s
popularity was also at an all time high, not least due also to his
populist steps in the direction of cultural liberalisation vis-à-vis
the non-Malay communities, particularly with respect to the eth-
nic Chinese. As such, the ‘feel good’ atmosphere amongst the
general population was then prevalent.
But the unforeseen arrival of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997),
the downfall of former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim,
coupled with the dire economic downturn came to generate a
massive sense of pessimism and gloom. Interestingly, Anwar’s
ouster did not result from any forced showdown by him with
Mahathir, but was symptomatically expressed in sharp policy dis-
agreements by certain key technocrats in Bank Negara over the
monetary aspect of the macro-economic management of the coun-
try. Particularly, the contested policy approach was over the trade
off between exchange and interest rate.
Here too, the crisis abruptly put to a stop the years of eco-
nomic buoyancy under the Suharto regime. The lack of support
and stamina by the technocracy and the established institutional
actors in policy-making for Suharto in the hey-days of the crisis
eroded his legitimacy and hastened his departure from the le-
vers of power. Likewise, it was hoped that the general sense of
discontent and backlash provoked by Anwar’s mistreatment
would precipitate in Mahathir’s removal from office. Nonethe-
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less, the traditional linkages and reciprocal relations between the
political elite/establishment and bureaucracy in Malaysia re-
mained intact, despite some internal rumblings.
The non-partisan role of the head of state, the Supreme Ruler
(Yang Di-Pertuan Agong) meant that the neutrality of the bu-
reaucracy, especially that of the defence and security forces could
be guaranteed and relied upon to safeguard the interests of the
status quo. Indeed, the response by the state to the anti-estab-
lishment momentum was swift and decisive. As such, save for
the exception of some key technocrats, e.g. Ahmad Don, Fong
Weng Phak, the bureaucracy remained loyal and committed to
the government of the day.
Arguably, the management of the financial and economic cri-
sis in the country involved as much preventing political uncer-
tainty and social unrest. That the country did not slide into a
situation warranting a proclamation of ‘emergency’ reminiscent
of the infamous 13 May incident(s) is to be attributed to firm
and rapid response in crisis management by the government
through the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) – a
semi-executive body tasked with steering the country out of the
Crisis and restoring financial and economic stability and nor-
malcy.
The formation of the NEAC in January 1998 under the chair-
manship of Mahathir with his key aide and principal economic
adviser, Daim Zainuddin as the Executive Director had been in-
strumental in cushioning the external shocks of the crisis and
guiding the country back to recovery. This helped to maintain
legitimacy and regime stability and restore some confidence in
the country’s economic fundamentals, although the Kuala
Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI), an indicator of market confi-
dence was not to revert to its high level until another decade.
Daim Zainuddin was one of the most influential cabinet mem-
bers of the Mahathir administration and also known to be a close
confidante of the prime minister.  A lawyer by training, he later
ventured into business after a stint with the civil service. He was
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to become successful in property development. His experience
in banking (as a shareholder) and technocratic role as Chairman
of the Urban Development Authority (UDA) would prove use-
ful for his major political appointment and for which he would
be most associated with, i.e. as the Finance Minister and Special
Economic Adviser of the Mahathir administration. He was ap-
pointed as Finance Minister by Mahathir in 1984, two years af-
ter winning the parliamentary seat of Kuala Muda (Kedah). He
served for seven years, and ironically was to reassume the post in
the aftermath of Anwar’s sacking in 1999.
According to Mahani (2002), the ‘modus operandi’ of the
NEAC was guided by three principles: a) formulation of mea-
sures that could effectively pull Malaysia out of the Crisis and
minimise the adverse impact on the economy; b) changing poli-
cies and measures quickly to respond to the changing situation;
and c) fine-tuning measures and removing any implementation
obstacles. The NEAC was soon to ‘take over’ and expand on the
scope of jurisdiction and authority normally residing with the
Ministry of Finance as the key institutional actor in economic
management to deal effectively with the Crisis. Thus, the deci-
sions of the NEAC was said to ‘override’ the Ministry of Finance
and by extension of the other ministries in government to en-
sure minimal conflict of vested power and interests, and intra-
governmental friction which could delay or jeopardise rapid policy
implementation.
The actual committee responsible for working on the details
of critical issues within the NEAC, i.e. the Working Group, in-
cluded technocrats such as Thong Yaw Hong, Zainal Aznam
Yusof, Mahani Zainal Abidin, and Siti Hajar Ismail.  Their pru-
dent and pragmatic measures – counter-cyclical – eased the pres-
sure on the economy (e.g. pegging the ringgit to the US dollar at
3.80, imposition of selective capital exchange controls, lowering
the statutory reserve requirement, etc.).
This time they had the unflinching cooperation of the new
governor of the Bank Negara in the person of Ali Abul Hassan
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Sulaiman who was brought in by Mahathir in September 1998.
Undoubtedly, he proved to be the right choice for the prime
minister as Bank Negara immediately lowered interest rates to
spur lending so as to revive the economy. In his speech at the
National Congress on Economic Recovery – “The Way Forward,”
Ali Abul Hassan made a thinly-veiled criticism of his predeces-
sor for “blindly [believing] in the IMF (International Monetary
Fund) mantra that a high interest rate regime was good for Ma-
laysia.”
Ali Abul Hassan also faithfully carried out the decision to
disallow the transfer of funds between external accounts by non-
residents – onshore (i.e. local) banks and countries of origin –
which at the time could have been interpreted as a defiance of
the IMF’s insistence of the free flow or movement of funds. This
effectively stopped overseas currency trading in the ringgit and
nipped the speculative activities in the bud. Hence, through the
instrumentality of Ali Abul Hassan, Malaysia maintained inde-
pendence in monetary policy and was placed on a more sustain-
able path towards recovery.
Even though he retired in 2000, Ali Abul Hassan was
honoured with the position of special economic adviser to
Mahathir in recognition of his valuable service. By default, the
appointment meant that Ali Abul Hassan was now a “confirmed
member” of Mahathir’s inner circle.  In other words, Mahathir’s
confidence in Ali Abul Hassan was secure because of the latter’s
devoted service and performance at Bank Negara. And there-
fore, rather than demonstrating that the Malaysian political elite
is reliant or dependent upon technocrats, the case of Ali Abul
Hassan amply indicate the reverse, i.e. the over-reliance of tech-
nocrats on politicians as the pre-eminent policy-makers of the
country.
The Crisis exposed the latent fault-line within the policy-mak-
ing institutions and processes – that is, between the political elite
and technocrats. In the case of Malaysia, the conflict was resolved
in favour of the political establishment which was able to justify
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its handling of the situation by recourse to existing economic
policies which had contributed to the country’s impressive growth
record.
This was, of course, coupled with the unyielding conviction
and personality of Mahathir who did not brook any alternative
view, much less from the non-political technocrats. Mahathir had,
prior to the Crisis, also enjoyed a strong mandate from the 1995
general elections which saw the ruling coalition he headed tri-
umphed with a landslide victory – the best since he came into
power in 1981. The counter-cyclical approach was vindicated when
Malaysia quickly bounced back from the doldrums from the Crisis
and made positive strides towards steady recovery. By 1999, the
economy grew by 5.4 per cent which was actually the highest in
the region (alongside Singapore).
Industrial production grew by 4 per cent in Q1 (first quarter)
of 1999 which more slightly more than doubled by Q2. In what
must be an indicator of the extent of confidence in the economic
recovery (“feel good” atmosphere), the KLCI rebounded strongly
from a low of 262 to range bound at 700-800. And this was also
matched by a marginal increase of FDI inflow, thus adding to
the capital stock of the country and further boosting economic
outlook and prospects.
As the new prime minister, Abdullah had wanted to intro-
duce a new style of governance which was supposed to be differ-
ent from the Mahathir era. As part of his inclusiveness, he urged
the people to ‘work with me, and not for me.’ Greater participa-
tion, accommodation and consensus have been attributed to
Abdullah’s style of leadership. Thus, Abdullah wanted to im-
press the people with a consultative and liberal spirit which would
relax the political inhibitions and constraints that existed previ-
ously. His people-friendly measures were comprehensive and sys-
tematic and extended beyond merely the public service delivery
system vis-à-vis the general public but also to the private sector.
On 11 January 2007, Abdullah set up a high-powered task
force called PEMUDAH to reduce bureaucratic processes (‘red-
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tape’) and facilitate the public-private sector partnership in line
with the transformation of the former from a regulator to an
enabler. When the economics-trained Nor Mohamed Yakcop –
who has a long and distinguished career in Bank Negara – was
retained by Abdullah for appointment as the Second Finance
Minister, detractors were cynical and sceptical about his ability.
There have been rumours that he was responsible for the con-
troversial nature of Bank Negara’s decision to trade in the inter-
national currencies (forex) market from 1992-1994 which osten-
sibly resulted in huge losses. Nonetheless, the impressive eco-
nomic record of 2004 was due to the macro-economic policy
decisions undertaken by Nor Mohamed which saw a high GDP
growth combined with lower structural deficit, and an increase
in market confidence.
The appointment of technocrats as ministers and advisers in
the Abdullah administration also seemed to epitomise a rein-
vigorated bureaucracy which had been marginalised and side-
lined in key decision-making processes under Mahathir. As one
who was a technocrat for many years, Abdullah was thought to
be able to unite all the elements of government which had suf-
fered a blow of credibility and reputation with the sacking of
Anwar.  It was argued that Abdullah’s son-in-law, Khairy
Jamaluddin also acted as an adviser to Abdullah. Together with
Khairy were his peers from university days and other associates
nicknamed the, “The ‘Fourth Floor Boys.” Unfortunately, the
impression conveyed to the popular imagination was that Khairy
through the “Fourth Floor Boys” was the “real power behind the
throne.”
Nonetheless, the 2008 general elections did not see the
Abdullah administration signalling a retreat or a backpedalling
on its avowed dependency on the renewed role of the techno-
crats in formulating and steering the economic direction and
orientation of the country.  On the contrary, there were efforts
to heighten the role of technocracy by co-opting the participa-
tion of the corporate sector. These private sector but government-
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linked actors then assumed the role as semi-technocrats with the
stamp of prime ministerial authority to promote efficiency and
effectiveness and professionalism of the government machinery.
These new breed of governmental actors were different from
the career bureaucrats such as the late Raja Tun Mohar Raja
Badiozaman, Thong Yaw Hong, GK Rama Iyer, Arshad Ayub,
and Ramon Navaratnam. Many of these illustrious personalities
had started their service during the nascent throes of the nation.
Some such as Raja Tun Mohar were appointed to lead the Ma-
laysian Airlines (the country’s national carrier) mid-way during
their career, whilst others like Thong Yaw Hong are now active
in the private sector in their capacity as board chairpersons and
advisers.
The Abdullah administration pressed ahead with the reform
agenda which included what can be described as the increasing
‘privatisation’ of the technocracy (as distinguished from the bu-
reaucracy as a whole), i.e. as the decision-making and policy-mak-
ing institution. Hence, the lines between a technocrat and a
‘corporatocrat’ have become for all intents and purposes blurred.
As such, actors who were not previously technocrats have now
assumed the role.
These new “semi-technocrats” increasingly functioned as “me-
diating actors” between the Cabinet as the highest decision-mak-
ing body in the country and the bureaucracy as represented at
ministry-level. This is discerned most clearly in the measuring of
the performance of ministries under the Ministry Key Result
Areas (MKRAs) which was later introduced by the Najib admin-
istration.
The MKRAs are overseen by these semi-technocrats. Nor
Mohamed Yakcop and Amirsham Aziz epitomise the technocrat
and semi-technocrat who – under the Abdullah administration
– have been invested with the responsibility of both representing
the executive in the government (bureaucracy) and legislature
(Senate/Dewan Negara). Nor Mohamed was the Finance Minis-
ter II under the Abdullah administration. Thus, he was tasked
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with the macro-economic management of the country.
Abdullah Badawi appointed Amirsham Aziz as a Minister
overseeing the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), Prime Minister’s
Department on 18 March 2008. This was just days after the re-
sults of the 12th general elections. The existence of GLCs strength-
ens the need and rationale for corporate governance culture and
practices in the bureaucracy. More so, the conceptual framework
envisaged in the continuous modernisation programme(s) of the
government is that the public and private sectors are partners
and thus engaged in a synergy.
The irony (paradox?) or arguably unintended consequence is
that the enhancement of the performance standards in the bu-
reaucracy under the helm of the technocrats and semi-techno-
crats tend to provide justification for the continuing direct and
particularly indirect involvement of the government in the
economy and the market. Thus, this situation would run counter
to or seemed to contradict the avowed pledge of the Najib ad-
ministration to depart from the era of ‘government knows best,’
and so create an ‘ecosystem’ whereby the private sector can flour-
ish. The aim to prevent a crowding out of private sector or do-
mestic direct investment (DDI) which has been drastically in
decline since the East Asian Financial Crisis when it had stood
at 35 per cent.
By extension, it could be immediately discerned that the semi-
technocrats pooled from the GLCs also play an important role
in promoting private sector expectations of the bureaucracy.
Hence, they bridge the performance link between the two sec-
tors in the synergistic partnership where one is the pacesetter
and enabler and the other has been accorded the salvaged role
or ‘honour’ of being the driver of economic growth.
However, implicit in the role of the semi-technocrats as policy
principal and agent is the government’s commitment towards
the maintenance and promotion of a stable macro-economic
environment. Thus, it is important to note that the complemen-
tary and indispensable role of the semi-technocrats is vital for a
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smooth and undisrupted transition to a more level-playing field
for the private sector in the economy. Hence, the role of the
semi-technocrats can well be situated in the need to manage the
bureaucratic institutions as well as managing the economic tran-
sition to steer the nation towards a developed status by 2020.
Indeed the bureaucracy and by extension the government has
benefitted from the enlistment of young, dynamic and promis-
ing professional who are drawn from the ranks of renowned con-
glomerates and firms – both national and international into the
top management of GLCs during Abdullah’s tenure, particu-
larly beginning in the second quarter of 2004. The elite appoint-
ments include Azman Mokhtar to head Khazanah Nasional (the
government’s premier investment arm), Wahid Omar (touted as
trouble-shooter) as the CEO of Telekom Malaysia (the nation’s
leading telecommunications entity), and Che Khalib Mohamed
Nor who was roped in to helm Tenaga Nasional (electricity).
Abdullah had also expressed the government’s desire to hire non-
Malays for top management posts. These corporate figures com-
prise some of the government’s potential pool of semi-techno-
crats and future policy makers.
3. THE POLITICS OF TECHNOCRACY AND NAJIBNOMICS
The role of technocrats and semi-technocrats is set to be more
prominent under the Najib administration. Amirsham Aziz is
seen as a rising star in public life having been propelled to greater
prominence under the Najib administration as the Chairman of
the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC) in June 2009.
Council members from the NEAC under Mahathir (which was
charged with formulation and implementation of economic re-
covery policies, and hence warranting the word, ‘Action’ in its
name), i.e. Dr Mahani Zainal Abidin and Zainal Aznam Yusof
were brought back into service. The rest of the council members
under the new economic council are Andrew Sheng, Dzulkifli
Abdul Razak, Hamzah Kassim, Yukon Huang, Homi J. Kharas,
Danny Quah, and Nicholas S Zefferys.
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The mandate of the NEAC was to advise the Najib adminis-
tration on how best to place Malaysia on a sustainable path to-
wards a high-growth and high-income nation by 2020. Despite
the rapid and impressive recovery from the Crisis, Malaysia has
not been able to breach the moderate growth rate of 5-6 per cent.
Although not absolute or definitive by itself, it impacts on the
amount of gross national income (GNI) or the total revenue which
a country is supposed to earn per year. By extension, a stagnant
GNI hampers the income per capita which is a crucial barom-
eter of economic status. Other corporate figures enlisted into
public service under the Najib administration include Dato’ Sri
Idris Jala, formerly CEO of MAS. He now serves as a Minister in
the Prime Minister’s Department and the CEO of PEMANDU
(Performance Management and Delivery Unit). PEMANDU was
formed on 16 September 2009 under the Najib administration.
Its role is to catalyse changes in the performance of the delivery
system as part of the Government Transformation Programme
(GTP).
Indeed, it is interesting that although Mahathir himself never
went that far in the ’hybridisation’ of the bureaucracy with the
appointment of “outsiders” into technocratic roles and positions,
it was precisely in line with his agenda of continuously
modernising the public service that his successor Abdullah and
the current prime minister Najib completed the ‘cross-over’ circle
of corporate figures (albeit from government-linked companies -
GLCs) joining the public sector and not just vice-versa as hith-
erto, i.e. former technocrats/bureaucrats taking up posts in the
private sector.Hence, under Najib the trend – as begun by his
predecessor, Abdullah Badawi – is increasing reliance on the
participation of the semi-technocrats in driving his reform agenda
– New Economic Model (NEM), Economic Transformation
Programme (ETP) and the Government Transformation
Programme (GTP). ‘Lurking’ in the background is also the po-
litical or expert advisers in Najib’s inner circle which of course
also a practice inherited from the previous administration made
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infamous by the so-called, ‘Fourth Floor Boys’ in the Prime
Minister’s office in Putrajaya. It has been said that the concept
of economic growth corridors on a regional basis was actually
incubated by non-governmental individual(s) close to Abdullah
Badawi, i.e. certain obscure personalities officially in the private
sector that formed part of his inner circle.
The emergence of new actors in policy-making, particularly
economic policies complicates the so-called relationship dichotomy
between the public and private sectors – how both sectors view
each other is being significantly altered by the continuous
modernisation of the bureaucracy, although to be sure preju-
dices and conventional perceptions remain (entrenched) espe-
cially with regards the execution and implementation of polices
at the micro-level and the public delivery system. A prominent
case (and even could be considered a ‘test case’) would the
Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA) which man-
ages the Iskandar Malaysia economic region, including process-
ing investor applications – functions like a one-stop centre which
seeks to avoid problems emanating from multiple or overlapping
jurisdictions, thus saving business time and costs. In other words,
IRDA combines the administrative capacity of the bureaucracy
with the corporate efficiency of the private sector.
The enlistment of the private sector in governmental com-
mittees such as PEMUDAH (which as mentioned was set under
the Abdullah administration) and of corporate figures in the
decision-making processes signifies that the government is mov-
ing from formulation of pro-market or market-oriented policies
towards their institutionalisation, at least at the macro-level of the
bureaucracy. Dato’ Seri Ahmad Husni Mohamad Hanadzlah
represents a technocrat groomed for political role – appointed to
full ministerial position on 10 April 2009 six days after Najib
became prime minister. His economics background and profes-
sional career with big foreign financial firms plus experience in
the civil service puts him out as an ideal person for party politi-
cal service, especially in the context of Malaysia where the rela-
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tionship between the ruling coalition as epitomised by the domi-
nant component party (UMNO) and the bureaucracy is very
strong.
Najib had once described himself as a “technocratic politi-
cian” in an interview with the Malaysian Business magazine
(1993). This was based on his early experience as a public affairs
manager with PETRONAS from 1974-1976. He also served briefly
with Bank Negara. Najib had studied industrial economics at
the University of Nottingham and the exposure there was to pro-
vide him with solid grounding in economic and financial policy.
Najib has brought in outsiders, including most controversially
an Omar Mustapha Ong into the Board of Directors of
PETRONAS. This was reluctantly accepted by the top manage-
ment and ensued in the “premature” retirement of Tan Sri Hassan
Marican as the CEO and Chairman. Interestingly, he was subse-
quently given an ‘offer’ by Najib to continue serving the country
although the terms were not spelt out publicly. Although strictly
speaking not a technocrat, Hassan Marican is a high calibre CEO
of the country’s most famous government-linked company (GLC)
and could have joined in the ranks of Amirsham Aziz and oth-
ers.
Under Najib, the role of the new technocracy could be clearly
seen in two respects, reflecting both continuity and change,
namely in the Government Transformation Programme (GTP)
and the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP). Hence,
technocracy under Abdullah and Najib are intimately and indis-
pensably linked with their respective reform agendas – which are
to promote political legitimacy and regime stability. The profes-
sional background of the prime ministers, it would seem, are
also influential in their attitude towards technocrats. Abdullah
was a technocrat before joining politics. (As mentioned, Najib
considers himself a technocrat).
Abdullah was the Principal Assistant Secretary of the National
Operations Council (NOC)/MAGERAN (Majlis Gerakan
Negara), Director of Youth at the Ministry of Culture, Youth
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and Sports after that, and later on as Deputy Director-General
of the same ministry. However, there is a characteristic trait
amongst all three prime ministers – Mahathir, Abdullah and
Najib in their decision-making and management styles, i.e. mi-
cro-management of the economy. In other words, post-Crisis eco-
nomic management remains essentially the same – ‘central plan-
ning’ where power is concentrated in the federal government,
most notably in the Prime Minister’s Department.
It could well be argued that technocrats and semi-technocrats
(together with his special advisers) rather than fellow ministers
and politicians are the ones responsible for formulating and imple-
menting ‘Najibnomics,’ a term coined to describe Najib’s policy
responses to the global  financial crisis and domestic economic
reforms. Detractors, on the other hand, like to compare the par-
allel between Najibnomics and Mahathir’s pump priming ap-
proach to stimulating the economy as infrastructure-driven. The
issue came into the fore of public attention when it was an-
nounced that the government is planning to construct the 100-
storey Warisan Merdeka tower in heart of the capital city.
Najib has claimed that the controversial idea originated not
from him but from Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), the GLC
mandated to promote the equity ownership of the Malays and
indigenous peoples of the country. That it did not precipitate
objections from technocrats is highly suggestive of the strong
support Najib currently enjoys from them, as well as renewed
confidence in his economic policies, not least as exemplified in
the NEM. Thus, there is a consensus in the policy-thinking
amongst the political elite and technocrats – both can be relied
upon to be rational actors who can agree on major economic
issues, particularly in the face of continuing global uncertain-
ties.
However, a broader perspective would acknowledge the mea-
sured and significant steps undertaken to continue to liberalise
the financial markets to position the nation as an attractive in-
vestment hub. In his speech at the “Investment Malaysia Confer-
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ence,” organised by Invest Malaysia, Najib reiterated his commit-
ment to sustaining nation’s reputation as a ‘diversified and broad-
based’ capital market in Asia, and the world’s largest syariah-com-
pliant bond market.
The Capital Market Master Plan of the government entails
“greater internationalisation.” The Master Plan seeks to (re)posi-
tion Malaysia’s capital market to enable “wider participation by
foreign investors.” Thus, the Master Plan envisages for Malaysia
to increase its attraction as an investment destination. Najib’s
foreign policy is, therefore, attuned towards portraying Malaysia’s
business-friendly credentials, especially in trying to tap into sov-
ereign wealth funds from China and East Asia - trading surplus
nations. This was precisely alluded to by Najib in his banquet
speech in Beijing to the Chinese business community.
The established or official technocracy under the helm of the
Chief Secretary to the Government, Sidek Hassan, remained true
to the maxim of “loyalty to the government of the day.” Inciden-
tally, he is also an economist by training and having served with
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and
rising to the rank of Secretary-General. The prime concern of
the bureaucracy since the Mahathir era has ever been its
modernisation and transformation process, and entrenched in-
terests and furtive resistance is limited to procedural issues such
as performance measurement schemes.
4. THE POLITICS OF THE NAJIB ADMINISTRATION
Najib was unable to outperform his predecessor (Abdullah)
and secure a strong mandate at the 13th general elections in 2013.
Since then, he has more or less balanced the advice and counsel
of the older technocrats and the semi-technocrats sourced from
the private sector as well as the unofficial members belonging to
his inner circle. Although there is much unanimity on economic
policy and strategy, there may still be a lack of political will to
carry his reforms through, either because of resentment from
the implementing bureaucrats or even opposition from his own
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party, UMNO. The 1MDB issue has eroded and weakened Najib’s
authority and standing in his own party. 1MDB – a GLC focus-
sing on strategic investments – was a personal ‘pet project’ of
Najib; and currently embroiled in a controversy over its accounts
with allegations that these were not properly audited.
On the ground, there is also the challenge to carry the people
together to support the implementation of the Good & Services
Tax (GST) which is ostensibly aimed at broadening the tax base
but which operates on the ‘consumer pay principle’ where the
fiscal burden is shifted towards the end of the supply chain. Heavy
reliance on consulting firms such as McKinsey and Boston (eco-
nomics) and APCO (politics) would always be subject to strin-
gent criticism by the opposition which claim that the policies
reflect a neo-liberal agenda detrimental to the interests of ordi-
nary citizens, particularly those on low income. Thus, although
both the Najib administration and the opposition which consid-
ers itself as a government-in-waiting have their own respective
reform agendas and objectives, the style and ideology are conten-
tious points. That is, although the diagnosis is more or less simi-
lar, the prognosis greatly differs.
As such, inadvertently, all of these factors allow the opposi-
tion to politicise the issue of the role of technocrats, semi-tech-
nocrats (‘new’ technocrats) and other advisers as contributing to
flawed economic policies which are inimical to the well-being of
the country in the long-run. The increasing role of semi-techno-
crats in blurring the lines within the policy formulation and de-
cision-making processes will also increase the technocracy’s expo-
sure (instead of insulation) to political pressures. It is expected
that with the reconfiguration of the technocracy in Malaysia, not
only is Najib’s economic fortunes but his political legitimacy is
also intimately tied to how effective he manages and balances
conflicting views both from within and outside.
DISCUSSION
Two years after the 13th general election, viz. in the second
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half of 2015, Najib’s political legitimacy within the administra-
tive system seemed to be effectively undermined and undercut
by forces who perceive him to be a political and economic liabil-
ity to the ruling party and country, respectively. On 28 July, Najib
suddenly reshuffled his Cabinet. Amongst the casualties were
the Deputy Prime Minister and the Attorney General. In the
following days and weeks, certain ranking officials associated with
the ‘anti-Najib forces’ were transferred to the Prime Minister’s
Department (although some eventually reverted to their original
posts and institutions). What has happened could well be tanta-
mount to a ‘coup d’état’ by some within both the political and
administrative elites. The scenario – of him in danger of being
ousted as Prime Minister – has its roots and revolved the thorny
issue of 1MDB which is a sovereign wealth fund and national
investment arm of the government of Malaysia. Najib had been
accused of siphoning funds belonging to 1MDB since the Wall
Street Journal published a report providing a ‘money-trail’ de-
tailing graphically how RM2.6 billion (USD700 million) ended
in the Prime Minister’s personal accounts.
 Whilst the ‘new’ technocrats remained loyal to Najib, the
rumour mill and conspiracy theories spinned about how certain
top figures of the administrative establishment (the ‘old’ techno-
crats) have been up in arms – plotting to force the Prime Minis-
ter to ‘go on (permanent) leave’ (euphemism for resignation). As
virtually all of the new technocrats are installed within a single
institution, namely the Prime Minister’s Department, mainly as
Ministers without Portfolio, this meant that Najib’s base of loy-
alty and support was highly concentrated. In contrast, the ‘old
technocrats’ were widely dispersed throughout the administra-
tive system – as would be normally expected. On hindsight, such
an arrangement (vis-à-vis the placements of the new technocrats
who owe their appointments solely to the Prime Minister of the
day) placed Najib in a vulnerable position that would easily ex-
pose him to marginalisation and isolation by the plotters.
In military parlance, the concentrated locus of Najib’s most
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reliable technocrats in terms of loyalty and support makes him –
as the centre of gravity – highly susceptible to encirclement or
convergence of attacks (wherein the attackers are able to rein-
force each other) by the old technocrats. Rumours swirling in
cyberspace talked about a high-level conspiracy in the form of a
‘task force’ to investigate and probe the alleged illicit funnelling
of funds into Najib’s personal account are said to have possibly
comprised the following (old technocrats and the traditional
bureaucrats):
a) The Governor of Central Bank – Bank Negara (perhaps blam-
ing Najib for the twin negative fundamentals of the contin-
ued slide of the ringgit vis-à-vis the US dollar which inevitably
eats into the foreign reserves as long as that is used to prop up
the currency alongside capital flight prompted by declining
foreign investor confidence in the debt repayment capacity of
the government even as the country is experiencing dimin-
ishing earnings from the commodities as major export rev-
enues of oil and crude palm oil);
b) Attorney-General (perhaps under some intense pressure him-
self to collaborate with the conspirators – as he is said to have
a chequered past aka skeletons in the cupboard);
c) The Inspector General of Police (?);
d) Certain directors from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Com-
mission (MACC).
Analogous to Carl Becker’s ephemeral versus affirmed events,
the events surrounding the so-called plot to overthrow Najib have
been subject to the ‘rumoured’ versus ‘official’ versions. The lines
between the two are porous and malleable to ‘cross- or layered
interpretations,’ i.e. the one represents the factual explanation
what is accessible and known to the public by direct ‘perception’
(the ‘crust’); and the other factual explanation which can only be
inferred or deduced (the ‘mantle’).
It has to be noted that these old technocrats were said to have
also colluded with key political leaders from the main opposi-
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tion parties (Democratic Action Party/ DAP and Parti Keadilan
Rakyat [People’s Justice Party]/ PKR). That old technocrats – who
are known to be committed and dedicated allies and co-
belligerents of the executive – should derogate from norms and
convention of the bureaucratic tradition perhaps signify a will-
ingness to ‘change players’ (in the form of replacing the Prime
Minister) for the sake of maintaining the status quo i.e., the es-
tablished order is akin to changing the practices but preserving
or conserving the structures.
It can be reasonably surmised that such a notion could have
been motivated by two factors, namely: a) the changing political
landscape or milieu where there is now a real prospect (and not
just a theoretical one) of a) change of government at the state
level which signals or serves as a harbinger of change of govern-
ment at the federal level; and the related and derivative of b) the
combined parliamentary opposition strength inching its way to-
wards a simple majority by way of the next general election (the
14th). The opposition, by contrast, seek in general to do away with
the structures but perhaps maintain some of the practices – so as
to ensure that their power base and authority is secured and se-
cure.
The power struggle – if one may call it such – is still on-going
and the administrative interference in politics marked an (in-
triguing) reversal of the historical situation in Malaysia. On 25
September 2015, Najib set up the Special Economic Committee
(SEC) comprising of figures from the public as well as private
sectors and headed by the ‘new’ technocrat, Abdul Wahid Omar,
whose appointment was owed solely to prime ministerial pre-
rogative. The role and terms of reference of the SEC is to formu-
late immediate and medium-term plans to strengthen Malaysia’s
fundamentals, including finding measures to halt the continu-
ous decline of the ringgit. This could also be considered an astute
move by Najib to consolidate and reinforce his position – by
shifting the burden of economic crisis management to the SEC,
thus creating an (added) layer of ‘protection around’ him and
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enhancing the stature and position of the new technocracy within
the administrative system of the executive branch of government.
Ironically, the entrenching of the new technocracy serves only
the partisan interests and objectives of Najib – as embodying the
epitome of the Malaysian political elite. Abstractly considered,
the new technocracy could arguably be conceived as the ‘missing
link’ (analogous to a missing ‘dynamic link library’ file that is
used to join two sub-systems or applications within the operat-
ing system together – an interface) in the relationship between
the political and the administrative systems. That is, the new
technocracy in Malaysia as standing half-way between the non-
political actors (administrative elite) on the one hand and the
political actors (political elite) on the other hand is able to bridge
the ‘political interests’ gap.
Thus far, the administrative elite do not officially serve party
political interests (but the government of the day). It requires
overt politicisation to ensure official subservience to party politi-
cal interests. The new technocracy avoids that need for overt
politicisation and yet at the same time because of the ‘chain of
command’ and thus organisational proximity with the political
elite i.e., under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister is
well-poised to execute party political interests in a much more
subtle and nuanced manner and style – behind the veneer of
outside technical expertise and knowledge.
IMPLICATION
Such a scenario or phenomenon turns on its head the cus-
tomary way of conceptualising the relationship between the po-
litical and administrative elites in the Asian, particularly Malay-
sian context under discussion. Both are policymakers, and his-
torically it has been the role of the technocracy in the adminis-
trative system to implement and enforce the policies that for the
most part originated from the political elite in the form of e.g.,
party manifestos. To be sure, the traditional top level bureau-
crats did advise on the viability and feasibility of proposed poli-
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cies. This meant that whilst officially neutral and non-partisan,
the traditional technocrats were the administrators and execu-
tors of politically-inspired policies.
But in the case of the new technocrats, it could be highlighted
here that the policies originate from them rather than the politi-
cal elite. In fact, that is one of the motivations and reasons for
the inclusion of these new technocrats in the first place. The
new technocrats function as dynamic (i.e. not absolute) equiva-
lent of ‘special advisers’ (Spads) found in countries such as the
UK. Spads play a useful role in a ‘two-party’ political system –
where there is a change of government and hence the changing
nature of policies. Here the new technocrats are supposed to be
makers of policies which are not political or politicised in nature
(given the nature of the policymaking process) whilst closely or
intimately aligned to the political fortunes and career of the Prime
Minister. In the final analysis, the presence new technocrats could
only serve to marginalise and erode the decision-making author-
ity and prestige of the traditional technocrats (in Malaysia). The
policies of the new technocracy will reflect a corporatist bend of
making savings and withdrawing or rationalising the subsidy
schemes, and reducing the fiscal deficit and debt burden as what
has been happening in Malaysia under the Najib administration.
Whilst it remains to be seen whether the entrenching of the new
technocracy will result in a ‘revolt’ by the traditional technocrats,
it is highly plausible that policymaking would be increasingly
‘outsourced’ to the new technocrats which may result in a revolt
by the political grassroots.
That is, the changing relationship between the political and
administrative elites could have – as an unintended consequence
of course – profound impact on the relationship between the
former and their party grassroots. Concretely, this means the
rank-and-file members of the ruling party in which case is UMNO.
In fact, this is already seen in the internal turmoil and discord
within UMNO over the 1MDB issue. The idea for the forma-
tion of 1MDB as a sovereign wealth fund did not originate from
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UMNO or the civil service but was the brainchild of personal
adviser of Najib who behaved in many ways not too dissimilar to
that of the new technocrat. This thesis also confirms the view or
perspective that, ultimately, in the Asian context, only the tradi-
tional (non-corporatist/ non-‘privatised’) technocracy could claim
to be the ‘defender’ of the status quo in a meaningful and sus-
tainable sense.
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